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ABSTRACT 
Since the reformation and democratization movement in 1998, Indonesians have 
faced a chronic corruption problem. At the beginning of reformation era in 
1998 to fight against corruption, the Indonesian government reforms the orga- 
nization structure of the Indonesia Police to be an independent body separated 
from the Military organization. The police reforms begun in 1999 and got legal 
foundation with Act No. 2/2002. However, since fourteen years, the level of 
police reform has not yet succeed because of low community satisfaction on 
police service and the intense conflicts always occur whenever ACA investigates 
the case of corruptions conducted by police leaders. Three conflicts between 
police institution and ACA have taken placed. By using institutionalism approach, 
this research focus on the reform in police themselves are major actors on how 
reforms are organized and managed. This study is interpretative in nature gained 
only through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared 
meanings, documents, tools, and other artefacts’. This finding revealed that 
this unsuccessful institutionalization process took place in a context of the 
main task of police for communicty service. Second, the study has demon- 
strated that three concepts from institutional theory as aforementioned 
provided vocabularies and insights to explain the phenomenon under study. 
Keyword: new intitutionalism. Anti Corruption Agency, police, corruption, con- 
flict 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early 20th century there were increasing demands 
for a police reform in order to professionalize the police, 
reduce corruption and political influence, and increase the 
accountability of the police to the law (Paun. C, 2007). 
  
 
 
 
Since the reformation and democratization movement in 1998, 
Indonesians have faced a chronic corruption problem. At the 
beginning of reformation era in 1998 to fight against corrup- 
tion, the Indonesian government reforms the organization struc- 
ture of the Indonesia Police to be an independent body sepa- 
rated from the Military organization. In addition, another anti- 
corruption body was also established in 2002 named Anti-Cor- 
ruption Commission (ACC) to fight against big corruption. 
The police also played a role as an instrument of control un- 
der the New Order government, especially through its role as an 
institution from which any permission should be sought for any 
social and political activities (Sukma, R., & Prasetyono, E. (2003). 
Meanwhile, after the New Order under the National Police Act 
No. 2/2002 stipulates that the police are an instrument of the 
state responsible for guarding public security and order and are 
tasked to protect, guide, and serve the public as well as uphold 
the law (Sukma, R., & Prasetyono, E., 2003). However, the In- 
donesian police has been ‘trenchantly criticized for being inef- 
fective, inefficient, brutal and corrupt’(Kunarto, 1995). As they 
are very poorly funded, inadequately trained, and insufficiently 
equipped, they have been completely incapable of fulfilling their 
duties, particularly in hot spot areas such as Aceh, Papua, Maluku, 
Kalimantan, and Central Sulawes. Indeed, the police are ill pre- 
pared to perform that function; a fact that has been acknowl- 
edged by the police themselves (Indonesian Observer, 18 De- 
cember 2000). Since the police joined the military and executed 
a paramilitary policing style, Polri has been characterised by three 
problems: their terrible weakness as law enforcers, the poor qual- 
ity of policing and an unhealthy police public relationship 
(Meliala, A. 2001). Institutional norms and practice of police 
must be brought into clear alignment with citizens’ interests and 
needs for safety and reassurance (influence) (Goldsmith, 2005). 
Levi argued that to ‘earn the trust of the citizens, government 
actors place themselves in institutional arrangements that struc- 
ture their incentives so as to make their best options those in 
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which their individual benefits depend on the provision of the 
collective benefit’ (1998). 
This study is interpretative research in new institutionalism 
perspectives that nature gained only through social construc- 
tions such as formal and informal constrains of institution. 
First, it provides a new understanding and a fresh explanation of 
how institutionalization of Indonesia’s police have taken place 
in the context of developing countries. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
According to Ostrom (1999), institutions have wide defini- 
tions and numerous concepts that are based on behavioural rules, 
norms and approaches. In other words, “institutions are the pre- 
scriptions that humans use to organise all forms of repetitive 
and structured interactions, including those within families, 
neighbourhoods, markets, firms, sport leagues, churches, private 
associations, and governments at all scales (Ostrom, 2005). The 
terms of institutions can be considered to include formal institu- 
tions, such as Constitution, government laws, charter, decree and 
statutes, and informal institutions, such as code of conducts, 
customs, local knowledge and social expectations (North, 1991, 
Quinn et al., 2007, Smajgl and Larson, 2007). 
North (1990) argues institutions are the rules of the game in 
society or, more formally, are humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incen- 
tives in human exchange, whether political, social or economic. 
Moreover, North argues that conceptually, the rules must be 
clearly distinguished from the players. Besides, the purpose of 
the rules is to define the way the game is played but the objective 
of the team within that set of rules is to win the game (North, 
1990). A key difference between organisation and institutions is 
as follows: organisation is a group of people that want to achieve 
the same goals bound by common purposes, and institutions are 
mainly the rules of the game or code of conduct that define so- 
cial practices and interactions among the stakeholders (North, 
  
1990). 
On the other hand, there are some problems with North’s 
exposition. Hodgson (2006) says that North is insufficiently clear 
about the distinction, (a) between institutions and organisation, 
and (b) between “formal rule” and “informal constraint”. The 
first problem arises if we define the organisation as an actor or 
player. North simply ignored that the instances when “the group 
of people that want to achieve the same goals bound by common 
purposes” may not be the case. North is less interested in the 
internal mechanism by which the organisations coerce or per- 
suade members to act together to some degree (Hodgson, 2006). 
In other words, an organisation involves structures or networks, 
and these cannot function without rules of communication, 
membership and sovereignty so in that case, organisation must 
be regarded as a type of institution (Hodgson, 2006). 
The second ambiguity of North’s argument is the distinction 
between formal “rules” and “informal” constraint. Some iden- 
tify formal with legal and look at informal rules as non-legal; in 
turn, if “formal” means “legal”, then it is not clear whether “in- 
formal” should mean illegal (Hodgson, 2006). Furthermore, it is 
possible to identify the formal as being that which is designed, 
and the informal as spontaneous institutions, along the lines of 
Carls’s distinction between pragmatic and organic organisation 
(Hodgson, 2006). Therefore, it is suggested that the terms for- 
mal and informal with regard to institution and rules should 
either be abandoned or employed with intense care. 
Another scholar says that institutions are also a body of norms, 
rules and practices that form behaviour and expectations of the 
stakeholders (Heywood, 2011). In other words, institutions can 
be described as the sets of working rules that are used to decide 
who is entitled to make decisions in some arena, what actions 
are permitted or restricted, what aggregation rules will be en- 
forced, what procedures must be obeyed, what information should 
or should not be shared, and what rewards or punishments will 
be given to stakeholders based on their action (Ostrom, 1990). 
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In regard to describing the difference between norms and law, 
norms is all of those settings that define proper behaviour and 
then these norms make it feasible for people to live together with- 
out excess (Ostrom, 1990). In addition, norms can build reputa- 
tion. On the other hand, law is established by Government and 
applied throughout society; Law is compulsory; a citizen cannot 
choose which laws to follow or to ignore (Heywood, 2011). Fur- 
thermore, law is also recognised as binding on those whom it 
affects and law has a civic quality in that is consists of codified, 
published and enforced (Heywood, 2011). In addition, law pro- 
vides rights to the people and promises that all the people or 
parties will be treated equally (Fennell, 2010). 
Institutions as rules and procedures (both formal and infor- 
mal) that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling 
actors behavior. How to distinguish between formal and infor- 
mal institutions is, however, less clear. Some scholars equate in- 
formal institutions with cultural traditions Others employ a state- 
societal distinction, treating state agencies and state-enforced rules 
as formal, and the rules and organizations within civil society as 
informal. Still others distinguish between informal norms, which 
are self-enforcing, and formal rules, which are enforced by a third 
party, often the state (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004) 
In the recent period we find two influential but contrasted 
ways to conceptualize the relation of informal and formal rules 
institutions The first is Hayek’s theory of law. It is influenced by 
the common law experience and sees law (like morals) as evolved 
abstract rules that have been selected through a lengthy histori- 
cal process of cultural evolution, where the advantageous rules 
have been filtered through group selection. The second promi- 
nent theory is North’s view of institutional change. North dis- 
tinguishes between formal and informal institutions, and under- 
lines the inertial character of the latter. Defining institutions as 
constraints, he notes that “informal constraints that are cultur- 
ally derived will not change immediately in reaction to changes 
in the formal rules,” leading to a “tension between altered for- 
  
TABLE 1. THREE PILLARS OF INSTITUTION 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: W Richard Scott, Institution and Organization, Sage, Los Angeles, 2009. 
 
mal rules and the persisting informal constraints.. While changes 
in formal rules are made and enforced by the polity, informal 
constraints are linked to cultural inheritance. North also strongly 
criticizes the mainstream approach to transition, emphasizing the 
limits to our understanding of institutional change (Chavance, 
2008). 
A number of authors have extended the new institutionalist 
view in terms of the interplay between formal and informal rules. 
Pejovich (1999) has put forward the “interaction thesis,” where 
different instances of relations are distinguished: 1) Formal in- 
stitutions suppress, but fail to change informal institutions; 2) 
Formal rules directly conflict with informal rules; 3) Formal rules 
are either ignored or rendered neutral; and 4) “Formal and in- 
formal rules cooperate” — as in cases where the state institution- 
alizes informal rules that had evolved spontaneously. Based on 
new institutionalism—which focuses on the interaction between 
an organization and its broader context and defines “institution” 
not only as the formal and informal processes and rules of an 
organization but also as systems of meanings and normative or- 
der that guide, incentivize, constrain, and encourage how indi- 
vidual and organizations operate and interact with each other 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; March & Olsen, 1984, 1989; Scott, 
1994). Further more Scott (2008) identified supporting institu- 
tion called “pillars” (Table 1). 
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Institution constraint and regularize behaviour. It has regula- 
tory processes that involve the capacity to establish rules, inspect 
other conformity to them and manipulate sanctions-rewards or 
punishment in an attempt to influence future behavior (Scott, 
2009). Normative pillar is placed on normative rules that intro- 
duce a prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimension in to 
social life, such as values and norms (Scott, 2009). Selznick (1996) 
suggests, organizational practices are not institutionalized unless 
they emerge to have distinctive forms, are infused with value 
beyond the technical task requirements, and are embedded with 
rituals and norms. Cultural pillar follows anthropologists theory 
which stresses the centrality of cultural-cognitive elements of in- 
stitutions: the nature of social reality and the frames through 
which meaning is made (again see Table 1). Cultural-cognitive 
pillar insist not only organization applies rules and enforce- 
ment mechanism, but also socially contructed (Scott, 2009). 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
The research in qualitative in nature trying to explore police 
organization as a institution. Police organization is heavily in- 
fluenced by one another’s actions or institution, and pattern their 
own behaviors after those of other organizations at large, they 
are continually in flux, as they are produced and reproduced in 
response to a larger social—that is, institutional—environment 
(Zorn et. al, 2010). Institutional pressures from the environment 
thus magnify the homogeneity of practices across institutions. 
Research emanating from institutional theory has empirically 
documented how common practices become established across 
multiple organizations, in order that organizations may be seen 
as legitimate members of a particular organizational field (Scott 
& Meyer, 1991; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). The document of 
Indonesia’s police reform and vary police survey could be impor- 
tant source of data for this paper. We try to combine many source 
of data from different research and classify into inttituionalist 
view of thinking. 
  
TABLE 2. INDONESIA POLICE REFORM SINCE 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bambang Widodo Umar, Indonesia Police Reform, IDSPS Press, Jakarta, 2009. 
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RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
We will describe and analyze the current status of Indonesia 
police reform into three sections: police reform policy, previous 
longintudinal community satisfaction on police service research 
done by other reseachers, corruption in police organization and 
the dynamic relation between police and ACA (anti Corruption 
Agency) in term of suspected high-rank police officers. 
 
POLICE REFORM POLICY 
Police reform in indonesia was preceded the release of Presi- 
dential Decree No. 2 1999 which ordered Defence Minister to 
set the police instituion separation from the armed forces. In 
july 2000 furthermore the government issued a Presidential 
Decree No. 89 / 2000 on the police institution status and role. 
This presidential decree stated that police is managed directly 
under the president. In the next august 2000, the government 
issued a Decree of House of Representatives No.VI. year 2000 
on the separation function and power of armed forces and po- 
lice and a Decree of House of Representatives No. VII year 2000 
on the role of the army and the role of police. Later on, Parlia- 
ment and Government continue to issuie Act No. 2 year 2002 
on the police (January 2009) (Umar, 2009). Since the act No. 2 
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Year 2002 issued, some police reforms were launched below (Table 
2). By using regulative pillar (structural change and legal change), 
those regulations become regulatory based for police institution 
to provide inducement to secure compliance. Relational system 
of new police institution based on Act No. 2/2002 created the 
new governance system: police under president and separated 
from the Army with specific mandate for public servant. 
In the Fig 1 below, since 1999 Indonesia police organization 
has develop police organization into the new five provincial units 
(POLDA-polisi daerah), 88 anti terror units, 31 narchotics units, 
30 regency/city units and 247 district units. This logic of police 
organizational development is basically based on the growing 
number of new autonomy city or regency after 1998. Regency/ 
city police organization (Polres-polisi resort) has similar service area 
with regency/city one. 
 
FIG. 1. THE POLICE ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
Source: Irjen Nanan Sukarna, Demoratic Policing,, SEMINAR FEDERASI KONTRAS-KONTRAS-IOM- 
PRAXISSESPIMPOL,LEMBANG 28 July 2009. 
  
However, since fifteen years the police reform has been 
launched, the cultural reform in police organization has been 
challenged by the public. How do police doing their job and 
roles as a public servant ? Is there any change from military cul- 
ture to service culture in police institution? Marzuki and Eko 
(2004) tried to do community survey on police service for local 
community in Pontianak, West Borneo with 250 respondents. 
The research found that there was very low public satisfaction 
on police service. Only 18 percent of respondents from the com- 
munity state that the police can handle the community reports 
satisfactorily signified by 18 percent reporting having very good 
experience. Similar to the previous figure, other data depicts 
vivid data on unsatisfied public toward the police service since 
the majority of the public (65.61 %) consider the police as either 
uncapable or bad. Only 7.69 percent of public that feel satisfied 
with the police service as they regard that the police service is 
good. Mean, one third of the public (27.69%) see that the police 
service is just fair. 
The number of public complaints to Indonesia Ombudsman 
confirmed the findings of Marzuki and Eko (2004) research above. 
Although the public complaint to National Ombustmant on 
police intitution decreased from 26.02% in 2008 to 12,02% in 
2013, but the police was the second-consistent rank complained 
public organization in term of the number of public complaints 
(see Table 3). In 2011, of 1867 to the Ombudsman, most cases 
reported by the public is local government service at 671 cases or 
35,94%. This fact revealed the similarities with the report to the 
Ombudsman RI in previous years. While second agency, Police 
of 325 reports or 17,41% awas also widely reported by the pub- 
lic, folowed by the Court at 178 reports (9,53%), National Land 
Agency at 165 (8,84%), as well as Ministry of 154 reports (8.25%). 
In the year 2013, based on the classification of report was three 
(3) most reported namely maladministration at local government 
of 2329 reports (45,02%), the police of 654 reports (12,91%), 
and ministries of 520 reports (10.05%). 
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Source: Indonesia Ombusman Report, www.ombudsman.go.id. 
 
 
FIG.2. PUBLIC EXPERIENCE ON POLICE SERVICE 
Source: Kompas Survey, 8 November 2013 
 
 
Meanwhile, the public complaint to National Police Commis- 
sion is 2014 was around 1,036 cases, 75% of thoses are bad 
police service, 21% of thoses were indicated an abuse of power. 
  
 
 
 
The most important findings showed that the criminal detective 
being the most police reported police institution (949 cases or 
70%). 
In 2013, Kompas (2013) did survey research on police ser- 
vice. It was not surprisingly that Kompas survey findings was not 
different with the Marzuku and Eko’s (2004) findings The re- 
search findings done by Kompas (2013) from 1000 respondents 
above confirms that police organization has not follow rules yet 
that much of behavior in an organization is specified by stan- 
dard operating procedures. The violations of police rules and 
regulation done by police officer are common cases found in 
different level of police office. Figure 4 can figure out the cur- 
rent data on the public satisfaction toward the police service. 
The public perceive that the police are too bureaucratic (52%) in 
providing their services. The rest (48%) of the public character- 
ize the police to have negative images including making power 
abuse, conducting procedure deviation, being incompetence, 
treating public unfairly, accepting bribery, and behaving 
unpolitely. 
 
POLICE, CORRUPTION AND ITS RELATION WITH ANTI 
CORRUPTION AGENCY (KPK-KOMISI PEMBERANTASAN 
KORUPSI) 
One of the normative pillar of institution is morally governed 
institution. How do police institution obey to clean governance 
values? In this case, we try investigate corruption in police orga- 
nization. Corruption in police organization has been a hot po- 
litical issue in Indonesia since democratization era in 1998. In 
the following description, we try to explore corruption case in 
police and the dynamic relation between police and Anti-Cor- 
ruption Agency (KPK) due to the determination of the suspects 
to high-rank police officer in corruption scandal. A research 
done by College of Police in 2009 (Table 4), a police school for 
high rank police officer, revealed that corruption could be found 
at all levels police or units organization, such as in six police 
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units namely criminal detective, intelligent security, front office, 
traffic management, personnel, and logistics (Umar, 2009). 
 
TABLE 4. CORRUPTION IN POLICE ORGANIZATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bambang Widodo Umar, Indonesia Police Reform, IDSPS Press, Jakarta, 2009 
 
 
Buttle J et.al (2015) concluded that the above corruption cases 
are the distinct nature of Indonesia police, which theory of cor- 
ruptions are only partially applicable to Indonesia. Illegal log- 
ging in national parks is also facilitated by collusive corruption, 
with government officials, military and police receiving bribes 
for overlooking these activities (McCarthy 2000). Some district 
officials claimed they were unable to convict offenders, because 
ofthe intervention of the police and military, who were underthe 
  
 
 
 
control of the central government (Smith, J, et. al, 2003). The 
most serious accusation that has been made in connection with 
the settlement of criminal cases is that the investigating officers 
can be persuaded to close their eyes to the crime committed and 
close the case under investigation citing insufficient evidence (to 
the detriment of the victim). This condition has incited loud 
protests from the public in high profile cases involving high level 
corruption (Reksodiputro in Holloway, 2002). In the most cases 
if the corruption took placed at the regency/city police office, 
police leaders are often ambivalent via-a-vis local corruption pros- 
ecutions (Clark, S. 2012). 
Police in Indonesia, like many countries, even when not ac- 
tively abusive, is lack a tradition of public service to the commu- 
nity at large, indifference ( like neglect, it is another form of un- 
responsiveness), a lack of dedication, incompetence, venality (petty 
corruption), extortion: this is more systematic and serious in 
nature than venality,relying on overt intimidation or actual vio- 
lence, inconsistency, intimidation, excessive force, brutality (Gold- 
smith, 2005). 
In addition, another anti-corruption body was also established 
in 2002 named Anti-Corruption Commission (ACA) to fight 
against big corruption. ACA was successful to bring big corrup- 
tors before the law. However, intense conflicts always occur when- 
ever ACA investigates the case of corruptions conducted by po- 
lice leaders. Three conflicts between police institution and ACA 
have taken place since ACA’s establishment. The first conflict 
took place in 2009 which was known as a “lizard versus crocodile 
case”. Next, a strong conflict between Police and ACA emerged 
again when ACA enacted Brigadier General Police Djoko Santoso 
as the accused in the corruption case. The latest dynamic rela- 
tion between police and ACA has taken place recently in the 
case of appointment General Budi Gunawan as the candidate of 
Indonesian Police leader. 
Act No. 30/2002, the statute that established the ACA (KPK), 
made it institutionally independent of government (art. 3). The 
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Law authorises the KPK to investigate and prosecute most cor- 
ruption cases itself and to take over corruption investigations 
and prosecutions from police and prosecutors in some circum- 
stances (arts 8 and 9). It gives the ACA (KPK) investigative pow- 
ers that the police lack. These include powers to wire-tap sus- 
pects’ phones without seeking court approval, to freeze bank ac- 
counts and to issue travel bans (art. 12). The Law also prohibits 
the ACA (KPK) from dropping a case once it has progressed 
beyond initial investigations – a restriction aimed at preventing 
prosecutions from being dropped in return for bribes (Fenwick 
2008). Ordinary police, prosecutors and judges appear poised to 
regain the exclusive control over corruption cases that they lost 
to the ACA (KPK) and the Corruption (Tipikor) Court under 
the 2002 ACA (KPK) Law (Butt, 2011). 
 
TABLE 5. WEAKENING ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kompas, 24 January 2015 
 
There were some serious attack actions on Anti Corruption 
Agency (KPK) in Indonesia from 2007 until 2015, namely de- 
creasing Commission Member (should be five members), legal 
action, criminalization by police, political statements and inves- 
tigation burden (see Table 4). In Indonesia, the combined man- 
dates that the KPK’s investigators and prosecutors be lent from 
the Attorney General’s Office and police, and that they be of 
  
 
 
 
highcompetence and integrity, leads to an “institutional ‘zero- 
sum game’... ,wherein the KPK draw[s] staff resources away from 
th[e other] Twoorganizations (Jacobs, L. G., & Wagner, B. B. 
(2007). 
It is interesting to look at conflict tense of ACA (KPK) and 
police in 2009, there was the public face-book movement to 
support the Corruption Eradication Committee, also known as 
the “Gecko vs. Crocodile” case. This case exemplifies the conver- 
gence of participatory culture and civic engagement that resulted 
in two of the most successful online collective movements in the 
last decade in Indonesia. The Gecko vs. Crocodile case (or KPK 
case) started in April 2009 when Susno Duadji, the National 
Police chief of detectives, found that the ACA (KPK) had tapped 
his phone while they were investigating a corruption case. Fur- 
thermore, Lim (2013) noted that the KPK had indeed armed 
itself with tools such as warrantless wiretaps to confront the en- 
demic corruption among high rank public officials. In a press 
conference, Duadji expressed his anger and compared the KPK 
to cicak, a common house gecko, fighting buaya, a crocodile, which 
symbolised the police. In September 2009 two KPK deputy chair- 
men Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Rianto, who had been 
suspended in July, were arrested on charges of extortion and brib- 
ery (Lim, 2013). The two men denied the charges, saying they 
were being framed to weaken the ACA (KPK). Most Indonesians 
perceived these charges as fabricated ones; some showed their 
support through an online campaign. In July 2009 immediately 
after the case against KPK appeared in the mainstream media, 
especially television, Movement of 1,000,000 Facebookers Sup- 
porting Chandra Hamzah & Bibit Samad Riyanto)was launched 
(Lim, 2013). By August 2009, the group had surpassed its goal of 
one million members in support of Bibit and Chandra. That 
particular Facebook support page was not the only one. YouTube 
videos about the case quickly emerged, including one with a 
Javanese rap song that was also distributed as a downloadable 
ring-tone. Online cartoons, comics and posters with depictions 
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of “gecko vs. crocodile” soon proliferated online. When the In- 
donesian Corruption Watch organized a street rally online, 5,000 
people showed up on the streets of Jakarta showing support for 
“the gecko.” This was followed by demonstrations in several other 
cities in support of the two men. On December 3, 2009, this 
public pressure saw charges against Bibit and Chandra dropped 
(Lim, 2013). 
In the latest conflict between ACA and police happened when 
Joko Widodo proposed Budi Gunawan as a Police Chief to Na- 
tional Parliament After that, in January, the ACA (KPK) named 
Budi a suspect for alleged financial misdeeds in his capacity as 
head of the Career Development Bureau at the National Police 
from 2004 to 2006, where he amassed a total of Rp 95 billion, 
allegedly acquired through bribes and gratuities, including bribes 
allegedly paid by officers in pursuit of higher police 
posts.Following the ACA (KPK)’s move, the police moved against 
two KPK commissioners, Abraham Samad and Bambang 
Widjojanto, by naming them suspects in petty criminal cases 
(Jakarta Post, 5/20/2015). After a month-long standoff, the KPK 
passed its probe into Budi onto the Attorney General’s Office 
(AGO), which then allowed the police to take it over. The chair- 
man of the independent team tasked to resolve tensions between 
the National Police and the Corruption Eradication Commis- 
sion (KPK), Ahmad Syafii Maarif, urged President Joko “Jokowi” 
Widodo to fire detective division chief Comr. Gen. Budi Waseso, 
whom Maarif described as the most responsible person behind 
the criminalization of those who are critical of the police 
(Jakartapost, 9/3/2015). In summary, by analysing conflict 
betweent police and ACA (KPK) from 2006 till 2015, police gov- 
ernance system created mutual agreement in whithin police or- 
ganization whenever the conflict with ACA (KPK) happened, by 
legitimate hierarchical authority or by non legitimate coercive 
means (Scott, 2009). Post the establishment of KPK, the cases 
were handled by Police and Public Prosecutor have completed 
quicker by 49 percent in comparison to those 
  
 
 
 
were dealt prior the establishment of KPK (Partohap, T. H., & 
Pradiptyo, R., 2015). 
Formal institutions as rules are readily observable through 
written documents or rules that are determined and executed 
through formal position, such as authority. In Indonesia, the 
corruption cases were handled by three legal institutions: Police, 
ACA and Prosecutor. Every institution seizes its authorities that 
are regulated by the law. This paper focuses to discuss two insti- 
tutions only, namely, Police and ACA, since when these two in- 
stitutions imposed their authorities; they produce various ten- 
sions, constraints, and disagreement in implementing their au- 
thorities. 
In the article 14 paragraph (1) point Law No. 2, 2002 about 
Indonesian National Police states that the main function of Po- 
lice is to conduct investigation and indictment towards all legal offenses 
in ACA accordance to criminal procedure acts and other laws. 
This main function of ACA in Criminal Procedure Acts (CPA) 
Article 6 paragraph (1) CPA states that investigator are Indone- 
sian Police officers and Civil servants with special authorities 
granted by law. Meanwhile, Article 6 point c Law no. 30, 2002 
about Anti-Corruption Acts (ACA) mentions that the functions 
of ACA are to conduct investigation and prosecution towards 
corruption crimes. And Article 11 point c gives a limitation that 
ACA can only investigate and prosecute corruption crimes that 
cause the state loss at least 1 billion Indonesian Rupiah (IDR). 
Ferawati (2013) argued that the regulations on functions and 
authorities of ACA and Police in Law No. 30, 2002 about ACA 
and Law No. 2, 2002 about Indonesian National Police are over- 
lapping with the reasons that various explicit functions and au- 
thorities in these Laws are just a kind of formality. It is because, 
in fact, instead of creating working harmony and synergy in eradi- 
cation corruption in Indonesia, these laws have become effective 
coordination segregation tools between Police and ACA. Tatuil 
(2013) said that the ways to overcome the disputes on the inves- 
tigation authority between two state institutions, ACA and Po- 
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lice, based on Article 50 Law No. 30, 2002, include: 
1. When a corruption case is found out and the KPK has not 
commenced its indictment process, while the case is being 
indicted by the Police or the Prosecutor’s Office, that institu- 
tion is obliged to inform the KPK at the latest fourteen days 
since the commencement of the indictment process. 
2. An indictment process being conducted by the Police or the 
Prosecutor’s Office as outlined in (1) must be coordinated 
continuously with the KPK. 
3. When the KPK has already commenced its indictment pro- 
cess, the Police or the Prosecutor’s Office no longer has the 
authority to conduct an indictment process. 
4. When an indictment process is being conducted concurrently 
by the Police and/or the Prosecutor’s Office and the KPK, 
the process conducted by the Police or the Prosecutor’s Of- 
fice shall cease immediately. 
 
Informal institution constitutes rules based on implicit un- 
derstandings, being in most socially derived parts and therefore 
it is not ACA acessible through written documents or it is neces- 
sarily sanctioned through formal position. Informal institutions 
include coordination and Supervision. There are some informal 
institutional problems that become the root of disharmonious 
relation between ACA and Police in eradicating corruption in 
Indonesia. The problems include not solid coordination patterns 
to work in team between the institutions and egocentric issues 
that exist in the institutions (Ferawati, 2013).ACA hold a wide 
range of authorities to coordinate with other authorized institu- 
tions to fight against corruption. Article 6 point a Law No. 30, 
2002 mentions that ACA retains coordination function with 
other authorized institutions to eradicate corruption. 
ACA should optimally implement coordination and supervi- 
sion functions (see Table 5) with both legal institutions (Police 
and Prosecutor) and governmental functional supervisory insti- 
tutions (Inspectorate General, the Finance and Development 
  
 
 
 
Comptroller, and Local Auditing Agency) Nugroho (2013). To 
be more specific, ACA should focus to coordinate and supervise 
in processing the corruption crime with Police and Prosecutor. 
Nugroho (2013) found that the coordination and supervision 
functions of ACA as enacted in Article 6 point a and b Law No. 
30, 2002 has been implemented and even getting better from 
year to year. However, investigators from attorney institution and 
Police in Central Java mentioned that functions of coordina- 
tion and supervision of ACA are not properly accomplished yet. 
ACA only undertakes coordination and supervision functions 
when ACA obtains reports from the society. Next, the constraints 
faced by ACA to perform its coordination and supervision func- 
tions in local level lay on legal factor, legal officer factor, and 
facilities factors. ACA encounters human resources shortages to 
accomplishe its corruption indictment coordination and super- 
vision functions. Consequently, the main task to cover coordi- 
nation and supervision functions all over Indonesian regions is 
not optimally undertaken. 
Other than coordination and supervision issues, a fundamen- 
tal problem in terms of informal institutional constraints is insti- 
tutional egoism, that is, in handling the corruption case, officers 
from every institution tend to protect their corruption-suspected 
colleagues to save the name of their institutional corps. One of 
the instances is the corruption case of driving license simulator. 
In this case, ACA had made early indictment and named the 
suspect Inspector General Joko Susilo. Soon, Police name three 
other suspects in this case. In the indictment process in this cor- 
ruption case, Police refers to the MoU signed by Police, ACA 
and Atterney on March 29 2012. Artile 8 poin 1 in the MoU 
mentions, “When some parties make indictment in the same 
case, to avoid investigation duplications, the institution that is 
obliged to proceed the investigation is the institution that issues 
the letter of order for investigation or a party under approval of 
other related parties.” 
Rachnaningsih (2013) stated that MoU signed by Police, ACA 
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and Prosecutor contains article that is in contradictory with the 
Law about ACA. Therefore, based on Civil Procedure Act the 
MoU was null and void. It is null and void because any agree- 
ment should be in contradiction with the existing and binding 
Law. As a result, Police could not use MoU as the basis for in- 
dictment in the case of Driving License Simulator. Besides null 
and void, the case had named Insp. General Djoko Susilo, a 
police personnel, as the suspect. As regulated in Article 11 point 
a Anti-Corruption Law, when Corruption case involve a legal 
apparatus, ACA is the right institution to undergo an indict- 
ment process. Moreover, if the corruption is more than 1 bil- 
lion, it is the authority of ACA to administer an indictment pro- 
cess. In this respect, the corruption case of Driving License Simu- 
lator reached an amount of IDR 198,7 billion. 
The dynamic relations between Police and ACA can be ana- 
lyzed from the perspective of new intuitionalism. In this light, 
institutional changes and reforms to eradicate corruption can be 
comprehensively seen from both formal and informal institu- 
tional aspects. Formal institutions need to perform various regu- 
lation revisions so that the overlapping regulations that 
accomodate the overlapping authorities of Police and ACA can 
be eliminated. Ferawati (2013) argued that Indonesian Police 
Law no 2, 2002, specifically article 13-19, should be revised. These 
articles regulate functions and authorities of Police as legal en- 
forcer. However, when an in-depth scientific study on these ar- 
ticles is conducted, many articles are not in line with them. For 
instance, article 13-19 are not compatible with article 6 – 7 Law 
No 30, 2002 about Anti-Corruption Commission and its pre- 
amble, article 103 of Criminal Code. Thus, Law on Indonesian 
Police cannot be harmonized with existing specific criminal law 
especially ACA law in terms of indictment processes. It seems 
necessary to mention the clear cut of the police task in the in- 
dictment functions that deals a specific crime, moreover, when 
such a specific crime has been regulated separately. Revision fo- 
cuses can be addressed to article 13 – 19 Law No. 2, 2002 about 
  
 
 
 
Indonesian Police to add the provision on functions and authori- 
ties of Police to handle specific criminal cases like corruption 
cases. This comprises the strategy to minimize the future rela- 
tional collision between police and ACA. Informal institutional 
reforms require agreements that emphasizes on strengthening 
professionalism culture, nurturing mutual respect, and reducing 
institutional egoism. Such agreements are demanded when en- 
forcing the law to the legal enforcer apparatus. 
Based on the above understanding, we hypothesize that the 
current institutional status quo (S) and its relative position to 
the idealized institutional setting (I) should constrain the possi- 
bility of reform space (R) and incentivize certain reform strate- 
gies (Fig 6), such as decoupling. 
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FIG. 3. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS AND HYPOTHESES OF REFORM STRATEGIES OF POLICE 
 
Fig 3. conceptualizes this idea of institutional gaps. The three 
pillars of institution discussed above are represented in the three 
axes in the diagram. The space, R, outlined as the area of AIS, 
represents the ideal characteristics of reform based on reliable 
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and valid data collection (process), a social obligation, morally 
governed, shame and honor (normative pillar) and constraints 
of executive power and good check and balance mechanisms to 
prevent frauds and abuse (power) (regulative pillar). 
In order to fill the gap (AIS), police leadership at all levelt 
unit is very important factor to encourage police reform This 
leadership has leadership characteristics, such as the charisma 
of the reform leaders as a figure example (humble and honest)their 
ability to articulate a clear vision for others to follow, and their 
ability to connect with other key stakeholders to mobilize their 
support, are very important and can alter the institutional land- 
scape and release the constraining forces (see Ho and Im, 2013). 
The second variable is citizen powers that allow citizens to ex- 
press their opinions and frustration, and the legal rights to pro- 
tect their freedom of speech through the media, such as in case 
of gecko vs. Crocodile and the Budi Gunawan Budi failed as the 
chief of national police. 
The third variable is police reform is affected by the 
establihment of ACA (KPK) due to the competition among the 
law enforcement agencies in combating corruption. The results 
show that both Police and Public Prosecutor have man- aged to 
reduce the length of period of judiciary process for corruption 
cases since the establishment of the ACA (KPK) (Partohap, T. 
H., & Pradiptyo, R. (2015). 
 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the Indonesia’s police reform is still at below of nor- 
mative phase of institutionalism. Police practices are not institu- 
tionalized yet they are not infused with value beyond the techni- 
cal task requirements, and are embedded with rituals and norms. 
Trust in the police does not only concern advancing coopera- 
tion and compliance with the law lack of trust in the police is 
also likely to undermine many people’s sense of safety and ulti- 
mately their subjective well (Tomassen, G, 2013). In addition to 
building trust, ways of institutionalizing distrust are needed. The 
  
 
 
 
problem is more of an institutional and societal problem than 
an individual and group problem (Kumssa, A. 2015). The sig- 
nificant and sustainable reform was achieved in East Germany, 
Eastern Slavonia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia, Northern 
Ireland and South Africa (Bayley, D. H. 2001). Those success- 
fully reforms were affected by the reform with considering the 
personal and institutional interests, a evidence-based policing that 
involves developing a new management style as well as reliable 
information systems (Bayley, D. H. 2001). By analyzing conflict 
between ACA and police, paper summarizes that the dynamic 
relational problems between ACA and police embody many con- 
straints. The constraints derive from formal institutional aspects 
due to the existing overlapping authorities of each institution. 
In addition, the constraints are also rooted in informal institu- 
tional aspects signified by the shortages of effective coordination 
and supervision as well as the strong institutional egoism in en- 
forcing the law to fight against corruption in Indonesia 
 
This paper had been presented at International Conference on Pub- 
lic Organization organized by Asia Pacific Society for Public Af- 
fairs, 27-28 August 2015 in Davao, Philipines. 
 
REFERENCES 
Bayley, D. H. (2001). Democratizing the police abroad: what to do and how to do it (p. 
3). US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice 
Butt, S. (2011). Anti-corruption reform in Indonesia: an obituary?. Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, 47(3), 381-394. 
Buttle, J. W., Davies, S. G., & Meliala, A. E. (2015). A cultural constraints theory of police 
corruption: Understanding the persistence of police corruption in contemporary In- 
donesia. Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology. 
Chavance, Bernard. (2008). “Formal and informal institutional change: the experience of 
postsocialist transformation”. The European Journal of Comparative Economics Vol. 
5, n. 1. 
Clark, S. (2012). Courting Corruption in Post-Suharto Indonesia: A Model of Local Cor- 
ruption Prosecutions in a New Democracy. 
Davies, S. G., Meliala, A., & Buttle, J. (2014). Gangnam Style versus Eye of the Tiger: 
people, police and procedural justice in Indonesia. Policing and Society, (ahead-of- 
print), 1-22. 
Fennell, S. 2010. Rules, rubrics and riches : the interrelations between legal reform and 
international development, Abingdon England ; New York, Routledge 
JOURNAL OF 
GOVERNMENT  & 
POLITICS 
 
 
263 
  
 
 
Vol. 7 No. 2 
May 2016 
 
 
 
 
264 
 
Ferawati, Meily. (2013). “Harmonisasi Pola Hubungan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi Dan 
Kepolisian Republik Indonesia Dalam Memberantas Tindak Pidana Korupsi Di Indone- 
sia”. Skripsi 
Goldsmith, A. (2005). Police reform and the problem of trust. Theoretical criminology, 
9(4), 443-470. 
Helmke, Gretchen and Levitsky, Steven. 2004. “Informal Institutions and Comparative 
Politics: A Research Agenda”. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4 Dec. 
Heywood, A. 2011. Global politics, Houndmills, Basingstoke Hampshire ; New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan 
Holloway, Richard. (2002). Stealing from the People 16 Studies of Corruption in Indone- 
sia Book 2: The Big Feast – Soldier, Judge, Banker, Civil Servant, the Aksara Founda- 
tion on behalf of the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, Jakarta. 
Hodgson, G. M. 2006. What are institutions? Journal of Economic Issues, 40, 1-25. 
Jacobs, L. G., & Wagner, B. B. (2007). Limits to the Independent Anti-Corruption Com- 
mission Model of Corruption Reform: Lessons from Indonesia. Pac. McGeorge Global 
Bus. & Dev. LJ, 20, 327 
Kumssa, A. (2015). Police Corruption: A Perspective on its Nature and Control. 
Kunarto (1995), Critics to Police (Merenungi Kritik Terhadap POLRI), Jakarta: Cipta 
Manunggal, 1995 
Levi, M. (1998) ‘A State of Trust’, in V. Braithwaite and M. Levi (eds) Trust and Gover- 
nance, pp. 77–101. New York: Russell Sage 
Lim, Merlyna, (2013),”Many Clicks but Little Sticks: Social Media Activism in Indonesia”, 
, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 2013Vol. 43, No. 4, 636–657) 
McCARTHY, J.F.(2000). The changing regime: forest propertyand reformasi in Indonesia. 
Development and Change, 31,91–129 
Meliala, A. (2001). Police as military: Indonesia’s experience. Policing: An International 
Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 24(3), 420-432. 
North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance, Cam- 
bridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press. 
North, D. C. 1991. Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 97-112. 
Nugroho, Hibnu. 2013. “Efektivitas Fungsi Koordinasi dan Supervisi Dalam Penyidikan 
Tindak Pidana Korupsi oleh Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi”. Jurnal Dinamika Hukum 
Vol. 13 No. 3 September. 
Lim, Merlyna, (2013),”Many Clicks but Little Sticks: Social Media Activism in Indonesia”, 
, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 2013Vol. 43, No. 4, 636–657) 
Pejovich, S. 1999. “The Effects of the Interaction of Formal and Informal Institutions on 
Social Stability and Economic Development”. Journal of Markets & Morality, 2(2). 
Rachnaningsih, Rani. 2013. “Benturan Kewenangan Polri Dan Kpk Sebagai Penyidik Dalam 
Kasus Simulator Sim (Kajian Yuridis Penyelesaian Melalui Memorandum Of Under- 
standing)”. Jurnal Ilmiah Untuk Memenuhi Sebagian Syarat-Syarat Untuk 
Memperoleh Gelar Kesarjanaan Dalam Ilmu Hukum Universitas Brawijaya Malang. 
Partohap, T. H., & Pradiptyo, R. (2015). Who Cares of Anti Corruption Agency? An As- 
sessment of Court Decisions for Corruption Cases in Indonesia Using Proportional 
Hazard Model1. An Assessment of Court Decisions for Corruption Cases in Indonesia 
Using Proportional Hazard Model (April 15, 2015) 
Paun, C. (2007). Democratization and police reform (Doctoral dissertation, FU Berlin). 
Pejovich, S.,(1999). “The Effects of the Interactionof Formal and Informal Institutions 
onSocial Stability and Economic Development”, Journal of Markets and Morality , 
Vol. 2, No. 2 
Scott, Richard W. (2009). Institution and Organization, Sage, Los Angeles, 2009. 
Selznick, P. (1996). Institutionalism “old” and “new.” Administrative Science Quarterly,  
41, 270-277. 
  
 
 
 
Smith, J., Obidzinski, K., Subarudi, S., & Suramenggala, I. (2003). Illegal logging, collu- 
sive corruption and fragmented governments in Kalimantan, Indonesia. International 
Forestry Review, 5(3), 293-302. 
Sukma, R., & Prasetyono, E. (2003). Security sector reform in Indonesia: The military and 
the police. La Haye, Netherland Institute of International Relations “Clindengael”, 
février, disponible sur< http://www. clingendael. nl/cru/pdf/working_paper_9. PDF 
Tatuil, Gidion. S. H. 2013. “Penyelesaian Sengketa Atas Kewenangan Penyidikan Kpk 
Dan Polisi Dalam Menangani Kasus Korupsi”. Lex et Societatis, Vol. I/No.3/Juli. 
Theodore E. Zorn (et. al (2010).”Institutional and NoninstitutionalInfluences on Informa- 
tion andCommunication Technology Adoptionand Use Among Nonprofit Organiza- 
tions”, Human Communication Research 37(2011) 1–33. 
Tat-Kei Hoand Tobin Im (2013). “Challenges in Building Effective and Competitive Gov- 
ernment in Developing Countries: An Institutional Logics Perspective”, American Re- 
view of Public Administration XX(X) 1 –18. 
Thomassen, G. (2013). Corruption and trust in the police: A cross-country study 
Umar, Bambang Widodo (2009). Indonesia Police Reform, Jakarta: IDSPS Press 
JOURNAL OF 
GOVERNMENT  & 
POLITICS 
 
 
265 
